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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this project is to answer a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Acquisition Research Program–sponsored thesis’ primary research question: How difficult is 
it to develop a successful incremental acquisition approach for defense acquisition programs 
(Acquisition Research Program, n.d.)? The research uses the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD’s) Joint Common Missile (JCM) program and the subsequent Joint Air-to-Ground 
Missile (JAGM) program as the basis for surveying acquisition professionals. This research 
prepares a preliminary survey to assess capabilities of future surveys and analysis of higher 
level acquisition scheduling and program planning.  
The preliminary survey created for this thesis helps to enable future research on 
survey and questionnaire methods in the acquisition academic environment. Feedback on the 
preliminary survey from acquisition subject matter experts helps to revise the survey as 
needed to finalize a detailed and effective survey for future use. Results of the preliminary 
survey will help the DOD acquisition community in developing future questionnaires and 
training programs for acquisition professionals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
In the current age of evolving threats, the need to expedite the development and 
procurement of systems with increased capability has become synonymous with national 
security. The most recent calls to “fix” the acquisition system by Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Jim Mattis brings attention to ongoing budget instability and long procurement 
lead times on major defense acquisition programs suffered by the Department of Defense 
(DOD; Mattis, 2018). Now, more than ever, acquisition professionals are faced with 
increased trade-offs in attempts to manage a program’s cost, schedule, and performance 
requirements, known in the acquisition community as a program’s “triple constraint,” 
and meet warfighter needs; development of a sound acquisition strategy is one way of doing 
this.  
The 5000 series of government policies have governed the U.S. DOD Acquisition 
System since 1971. The DOD has made multiple updates to the series since that time. The 
current DOD Directive 5000.1 provides management principles and government acquisition 
policies and procedures for managing all the DOD’s acquisition programs (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acqusition, Technology, and Logisitcs [OUSD(AT&L)], 
2007). DOD Instruction 5000.02 reflects the 5000.01 directives and provides the detailed 
procedures that help guide acquisition decision-makers throughout the life cycle of a DOD 
acquisition program (OUSD[AT&L], 2017a). The current version of the 5000.01 was last 
updated in 2007, and the 5000.02 is current as of 2017. Both documents outline the need for 
an appropriate acquisition strategy that addresses the technological risk to maturity and 
program performance goals, as well as schedule and budgetary constraints. 
The current DOD Directive 5000.01, dated November 20, 2007, clearly states that an 
evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy, with an incremental approach is the DOD’s preferred 
approach to ensuring technology is mature enough to provide warfighters with needed 
equipment in a timely manner and within budget constraints (OUSD[AT&L], 2007). A 
leading reason for schedule delays and excessive budgetary expenditures in defense 
acquisition is the lack of technological maturation. Calendar-driven schedules apply pressure 
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on acquisition professionals to procure materiel that is not yet ready for the warfighter to use. 
An incremental approach allows a program’s technology to mature while completed elements 
are delivered to bridge the time gap between a user’s request and a program’s final increment 
delivery.  
A U.S. DOD program’s acquisition strategy (AS) is the plan to achieve goals and 
execute the program in its entirety. The program manager (PM) uses the AS to describe the 
management approach and basis for planning and executing all programmatic goals 
throughout the life of the program while addressing and maintaining the program is within 
the boundaries of cost, schedule, and performance. The program schedule, processes 
required, major risks, funding, and business aspects are all summarized in the AS 
(“Acquisition Strategy [AS],” 2017). The AS allows senior leaders and decision-makers the 
ability to assess whether the PM’s overall strategy reflects DOD priorities, follows proper 
business standards, and allows a program the best chances of becoming an operational asset 
for the end-user. 
The 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) defines evolutionary 
acquisition and incremental approaches by explaining that  
the term “evolutionary acquisition process” means a process by which an 
acquisition program is conducted through discrete phases or blocks, with each 
phase or block consisting of the planned definition, development, production 
or acquisition, and fielding of hardware or software that provides 
operationally useful capability. The term “increment,” with respect to an 
evolutionary acquisition program, means one of the discrete phases or blocks 
of such program. (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
2002, § 802(c) (1-2), p. 2603).  
Organizations have used evolutionary acquisition practices since the early 1950s. The X-15 
Hypersonic jet, developed by North American Aviation, used an evolutionary and 
incremental approach during its development. This strategy influenced the design of NASA 
spacecraft during the early stages of the Mercury space program and IBM’s evolutionary 
software design (Larman & Vasili, 2003). 
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The difficulty posed to DOD acquisition professionals in implementing an EA 
strategy with incremental approach on major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) is the 
object of this research. This study compares the current Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) 
program to its predecessor, the Joint Common Missile (JCM), to determine the issues 
involving the PM’s responsibility in management of cost, performance, and schedule. The 
ultimate goal of this research is to develop a survey to be completed by DOD acquisition 
professionals that will facilitate the determination of difficulty these professionals face in the 
implementation of the DOD’s preferred acquisition approach. This thesis provides a 
framework for subsequent students to design and distribute a follow-on survey and use their 
results to gain an understanding of which critical requirement factors are considered to 
develop program schedules.  
1. Research Questions 
a. Primary Question  
• How difficult is it to develop a successful incremental acquisition approach 
for defense acquisition programs (Acquisition Research Program, n.d.)? 
b. Secondary Questions 
• What is the history of evolutionary acquisition and an incremental 
development approach?  
• Currently, how effective is the Department of Defense at implementing an EA 
strategy with an incremental approach? 
• What is an example of a successful implementation of an incremental 
approach?  
• How did the Joint Common Missile evolve into the Joint Air-to-Ground 
Missile program?  
• To what extent do acquisition professionals understand program risks and the 
necessity of using an incremental approach? 
2. Scope, Limitations, and Assumptions 
The research for this thesis is tied to existing acquisition policy and MDAPs. The 
scope of the research identifies how incremental development became the preferred approach 
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for defense acquisition programs. Acquisition professionals are the target population to 
gather information and understand how the workforce uses the preferred approach. However, 
the research is limited to developing a survey for future evaluation of acquisition 
professionals’ implementation of an incremental approach, given critical program risks, 
requirements, and budgetary constraints. Program information from the JCM and JAGM 
provides data to develop the survey for understanding the level of acquisition professionals’ 
implementation of an acquisition strategy with an incremental approach. Data from these two 
programs provide critical information for the survey without giving the target audience a 
solution.  
An assumption in the research is the level of competence acquisition professionals 
have of the DOD 5000 series. The survey hinges on the notion that each member of the target 
audience has a basic understanding of EA with an incremental approach. Acquisition 
professionals should be able to assess basic risk and requirements data to build an acquisition 
strategy. Another assumption in building the survey relies on the absence of external factors 
and current budgetary environment. Administration of the survey is in a controlled 
environment, and the survey provides pertinent constraints and useful data to establish the 
planning setting.  
3. Methodology (Survey) 
The research methodology consists of three areas: a literature review, JCM and 
JAGM requirements documentation review, and the selection and development of a 
qualitative survey. The literature review follows the history of EA from being a consideration 
to its establishment as the preferred approach within the DOD’s acquisition framework. 
Additionally, the literature review provides the reader with an overview of the merits of EA 
and justifies the DOD’s position in establishing EA as the preferred acquisition approach.  
The review of JCM and JAGM documentation follows the metamorphosis of program 
performance requirements without a change to user needs. An analysis of critical risk factors 
informs the reader of system complexity and provides an alternative view as to the proposed 
schedule. Finally, the development of a qualitative survey gives researchers the ability to 
gain an understanding of the difficulty presented to acquisition professionals in implementing 
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the DOD’s preferred acquisition strategy. This study addresses expected results and provides 
a sample of the survey in the Appendix.   
4. Benefits of Research 
This thesis will benefit current and future DOD acquisition professionals who manage 
the cost, performance, and schedule of defense programs. Additionally, it will provide insight 
to defense policy-makers on the environmental pressures of implementing an EA strategy 
with incremental approach. 
5. Organization of Study 
Chapter I introduces the research objective, research questions, and data collection 
methods and sources used to collect and analyze data. Additionally, Chapter I provides 
assumptions, benefits, and limitations for the research topic. 
Chapter II provides a history of EA. The chapter traces the DOD application of EA 
and incremental approaches from the mid-1980s to the present day and the policies and 
procedures that govern EA uses. 
Chapter III provides an analysis of the JCM program and its eventual transformation 
into the JAGM program. A thorough examination of the initial requirements, eventual 
cancellation, and reinstatement of the program as the JAGM is critical to this research. In 
addition, the identification of the both programs’ risk management, requirements, and 
budgetary considerations are pertinent data inputs. The information from these program 
documents provides critical details to use for survey development to gain an understanding of 
acquisition professionals’ implementation of incremental development.  
Chapter IV provides an explanation of the data collection methodology and survey 
development for use in future distribution to acquisition professionals. This section 
incorporates select background information on the JCM program and develops questions 
related to cost, schedule, and performance parameters that the PM would be responsible for. 
Additionally, this chapter provides an analysis of each section of the survey and describes the 
type of information that each section is designed to collect from survey participants.  
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Chapter V provides an analysis of results from a beta testing sample for 
improvements to the survey. Additionally, this chapter provides a conclusion and 
recommendation for future use of the survey.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW (EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION AND 
INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT) 
A. PACKARD COMMISSION (1986) 
In 1981, the Project on Government Oversight, a nonpartisan independent watchdog, 
reported on U.S. military acquisition mismanagement and gross overspending due to 
contractor overcharging, price distortion, and contract mismanagement. The report outlined 
such infamous items as a $435 hammer and, along with other reports, led President Ronald 
Reagan to appoint a commission to study defense acquisition spending and the problems 
surrounding defense management and acquisition organizations (Barron, 1983). David 
Packard, who co-founded the computer company Hewlett-Packard and who served as the 
U.S. deputy secretary of defense from 1969 to 1971 and chairman of the Business Council 
from 1973 to 1974, led the Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense Management, what is now 
known as the Packard Commission (“Obituary for David Packard,” 2007). The report’s 
recommendations for acquisition organization and procedures included the creation of the 
new positions under secretary of defense for acquisition, and separate service acquisition 
executive positions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The report also recommended the 
increased use of prototyping, testing, and commercial business practices to increase 
competition and lower procurement costs.  
“Baselining” programs was the most important recommendation from the Packard 
Commission that affected PMs. The report recommended that the “DOD should fully 
institutionalize ‘baselining’ for major weapons systems at the initiation of full-scale 
engineering development. Establishment of a firm internal agreement or baseline on the 
requirements, design, production, and cost of weapon systems will enhance program 
stability” (Packard, 1986, p. xxvi ). The recommendation helped establish the acquisition 
program baseline (APB), later codified by the 1987 NDAA. The Packard Commission did 
not create or implement any laws; however, some of its recommendations were addressed by 
the Goldwater–Nichols Act later in 1986. 
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B. GOLDWATER–NICHOLS (1986) 
The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
implemented multiple laws to reorganize the DOD and outlined policies that enabled more 
efficient use of defense resources. The act gave the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
more autonomy in the reorganization of the different staff positions and the interaction with 
the military service chiefs. Part of the OSD reorganization was the official creation of the 
under secretary of defense for acquisition (USD[A]) position. The Goldwater–Nichols Act 
provided the OSD a centralized figure that oversees and thoroughly manages MDAPs.  
The lack of joint procurement and system interoperability between the services 
plagued DOD operations prior to the Goldwater–Nichols Act. Service chiefs led the different 
organizations, and joint efforts were strained by the lack of cross organization. The act gave 
greater authority to combatant commanders instead of service chiefs, which enabled joint 
service support when organizing, equipping, training, and executing specific regional 
missions. Shared procurement between services enabled interoperability of new technology 
and increased joint collaboration during program development (Goldwater–Nichols, 1986).   
C. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT (1987) 
In addition to the Goldwater–Nichols Act, the 1987 NDAA also codified 
recommendations from the Packard Commission. The NDAA details the duties and 
precedence of the USD(A) as well as the deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition. 
The USD(A) is the senior procurement executive for the DOD. The act gives authority to the 
USD(A) over service secretaries regarding acquisition activities within the DOD. The NDAA 
made changes to enhance program stability and required the USD(A) to ensure that the 
service secretaries established a baseline description for MDAPs. The service secretaries 
established the baseline for their own jurisdiction and detailed the cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints placed upon the PM for each MDAP. Any deviation of the baseline 
required the PM to immediately submit a Program Deviation Report (PDR) to the specific 
service secretary for review and decision (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1987, 1986).   
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D. JOINT LOGISTICS CENTER GUIDANCE (1987) 
In 1987, the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLCs) published guidance as it relates to 
the use of an EA strategy in the procurement of command and control (C2) systems. 
Supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), this guidance served as an 
endorsement by encouraging an EA strategy in the acquisition of C2 systems (A’Hearn, 
Bergmen, & Hirsch, 1988). The attraction to adopting an EA strategy was prevalent, as the 
results of two major C2 studies recently determined that conventional acquisition strategies 
led to suboptimal outcomes.  
Furthermore, the merits of selecting an EA strategy came from the delivery of 
capability in increments, rather than in one step. This allowed for the system to achieve full 
capability through evolution, while still delivering increments of capability to the warfighter 
throughout the system life cycle. Ultimately, the JLC guidance served the purpose of 
expressing support to OSD guidance, decomposing OSD-level guidance into actionable joint 
guidance, providing an assessment on when to use EA, defining EA, and identifying several 
management techniques for successfully implementing an EA strategy (A’Hearn et al., 
1988). 
E. 5000.01 (1987) 
The 1987 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.01 is the first to mention 
the implementation of a program baseline to codify program cost, performance, and 
schedule. As defined by the directive, the program baseline is 
a formal agreement between a PM and a PEO [Program Executive Officer], 
SAE [Service Acquisition Executive], or the DAE [Defense Acquisition 
Executive] that briefly summarizes factors critical to the success of a program, 
such as functional specifications, cost, and schedule objectives and 
requirements, against which the program will subsequently be evaluated. 
(OUSD[A], 1987, p. 3)  
The implementation of a program baseline was intended to enhance program stability 
by providing governing metrics used to gauge program progress. It is here that full 
responsibility of the program was placed on the PM for management. As a result, PMs were 
given the appropriate authority and resources required to achieve the established baselines. 
The program baseline also served to minimize changes to funding and system requirements, 
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therefore allowing programs to exhibit increased stability. Following this theme, the 5000.01 
also requires that PMs consider the use of evolutionary alternatives to properly balance 
system development and production risk. This is the first mention of EA in the series of 
acquisition directives. 
F. 5000.02 (1991) 
The 1991 Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 speaks to the primary 
goal of an acquisition strategy in minimizing program cost and schedule to field a desired 
capability. Of the various management strategies offered, the 5000.02 offers an EA strategy 
for consideration in programs where a high technology risk is present and refinements to 
requirements are anticipated (OUSD[AT&L],1991). The instruction defines EA as 
an approach in which a core capability is fielded, and the system design has a 
modular structure and provisions for future upgrades and changes as 
requirements are refined. An evolutionary acquisition strategy is well suited to 
high technology and software intensive programs where requirements beyond 
a core capability can generally, but not specifically, be defined. This approach 
is described in Joint Logistics Commanders Guidance, “Evolutionary 
Acquisition, An Alternative Strategy for Acquiring Command and Control 
(C2) Systems.” (OUSD[AT&L], 1991, p. 5-A-2).  
This EA strategy is still considered an alternative approach in this context; however, 
emphasis is heavily placed on consideration in the document.  
G. 5000.01 (1996) 
The 1996 DOD 5000.01 policy marked a shift in the adoption of EA strategies for 
defense programs. As noted in the 1991 DOD 5000 series, the instructions encouraged 
program managers to consider implementing nontraditional approaches for acquisition 
strategies and schedules. The 1996 DOD 5000.01 altered the language to state the acquisition 
community “shall” make use of nontraditional techniques as necessary. One of the 
highlighted techniques was evolutionary and incremental acquisition. Other techniques 
included rapid prototyping, advanced technology demonstrations, and flexible technology 
insertion. This transition placed a greater emphasis on program managers to utilize an 
evolutionary or incremental acquisition approach (OUSD[AT&L], 1996). This is the first 
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time incremental approaches are associated with the preferred EA strategy that was 
documented in the 1987 5000.01. 
H. 5000.01 (2000) 
In 2000, the DOD placed even greater emphasis on EA and incremental development. 
The language in the directive identified how the DOD wanted EA as the preferred approach 
for strategies and schedules, and not just utilization where appropriate, as outlined in the 
1996 directive. The initiative to use EA relied on the necessity to provide capability to the 
warfighter as quickly as possible. In order to fulfill the operational needs of the services, the 
secretary of defense and acquisition community viewed EA with increments as the most 
capable approach. The directive also identified the use of blocks as increments to provide 
capability to the warfighter depending on the technology maturity, requirements based on 
time, and a plan for subsequent development over time past the initial capability. PMs needed 
to evaluate factors of the requirements urgency, critical technology maturity, and 
inoperability of the system. The idea of a modularity and open system designs were prevalent 
in the directive to enable the upgrades as the weapon system evolved over time. An 
incremental schedule was the proper method of phasing requirements and technology 
availability. In 2000, the DOD identified an overhaul and adoption of EA and use of 
increments to develop an acquisition strategy and schedule. These changes signaled a 
remarkable transition to evolve and build a system over time from previous acquisition 
development concepts (OUSD[AT&L], 2000). Figure 1 outlines three different steps with 
dedicated acquisition phases and milestones that are representative of a program with 
multiple increments.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy  - 12 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 1.  Incremental Approach. Source: Mortlock (2017). 
I. 5000.01 (2003) 
The updated 5000.01 directive was released in May 2003 and specifically identifies 
EA within the policy objectives of the 2003 NDAA. “Flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, 
discipline, and streamlined and effective management” (OUSD[AT&L], 2003, p. 1-2) were 
the policies identified in the 2003 5000.01 that governed the defense acquisition system. The 
directive places an emphasis on responsiveness by identifying the need to match user 
requirements with available technologies. “Approved, time-phased capability needs matched 
with available technology and resources enable EA strategies. EA strategies are the preferred 
approach to satisfying operational needs. Spiral development is the preferred process for 
executing such strategies” (OUSD[AT&L], 2003, p. 2). 
The spiral development model has two distinguishing features: “One is a cyclic 
approach for incrementally growing a system’s degree of definition and implementation 
while decreasing its degree of risk. The other is a set of anchor point milestones for ensuring 
stakeholder commitment to feasible and mutually satisfactory system solutions” (Boehm & 
Hansen, 2001, p. 2). Spiral development does not clearly define requirements and objectives 
for a program’s end goal. The lack of planning for a program’s finality necessitated another 
update to 5000.01 in 2007. 
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J. 5000.01 (2007) 
The 2007 5000.01 made a slight but important update to policies describing the 
responsiveness of MDAPs. The policy implemented the change from spiral development to 
incremental development as the preferred process for executing EA strategies 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2007). Incremental approaches provide clear requirements for each 
increment and an end-state for a specific acquisition program. The incremental approach falls 
in line with the goal of program stability outlined in the 5000.01 when referring to the 
development of “realistic program schedules, long-range investment plans, and affordability 
assessments, and shall strive to ensure stable program funding” (OUSD[AT&L], 2007, p. 9).  
K. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS (2014 & 2016) 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzed and reported on the use of 
an incremental approach on Information Technology (IT) centric systems in recent years. 
The report from 2014 focused on the need to implement an incremental approach for 
government agencies. The report from 2016 evaluated how agencies implemented an 
incremental approach since 2014.  
The GAO report from 2014 outlines the need to utilize an incremental approach due 
to significant cost overruns and schedule delays quantified in years (Government 
Accountability Office, 2014). Focused on IT intensive programs, the report assesses two 
areas: Whether agencies have established policies utilizing an incremental approach on IT 
intensive programs and if they are using an incremental approach on those programs 
(Government Accountability Office, 2014). The report found that few DOD programs 
delivered functionality indicative of an incremental approach. 
The GAO report from 2016 focuses on government reporting of what programs are 
using an incremental approach. The report identified that DOD exhibited lower rates of 
utilizing incremental approaches. However, insufficient DOD reporting led to GAOs inability 
to analyze the DODs ability to implement the preferred acquisition strategy (Government 
Accountability Office, 2016).  
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L. SMALL DIAMETER BOMB 
A success story of implementing an EA strategy with an incremental approach is the 
Air Force’s Small Diameter Bomb (SDB). In 2017, the Research and Development (RAND) 
Corporation published a study of Air Force MDAPs. RAND identified four major programs 
that experienced a low cost growth, and the SDB was one of the four examples of a 
successful program (Lorell, Payne, & Mehta, 2017). The SDB used two increments to deliver 
capability to the warfighter while maturing high-risk technology, which is a common practice 
when using an incremental approach for schedule development.   
The study identified two characteristics for a successful program. The first was a 
realistic cost estimate prior to Milestone (MS) B. The second characteristic highlighted the 
importance of an incremental strategy as an imperative for success (Lorell et al., 2017). Six 
programs with extreme cost growth had immature technology, ambiguous requirements, or 
insufficient cost estimates before MS B. The same programs possessed inadequate strategies 
and schedules without an incremental approach and combined MS B and C under the 
assumption of little need for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E; Lorell et 
al., 2017). These metrics established the RAND study’s foundation for the evaluation of Air 
Force MDAPs and correlation to cost growth and program performance. SDB divided the 
program into two increments with distinct differences between mission and capability.  
SDB I increment is an example of achieving feasible requirements with more high-
risk technology maturation for the later increments. The mission of the SDB I was to provide 
a GPS-guided smart munition capable of targeting stationary targets in extreme weather 
conditions both day and night. The threshold aircraft for the first increment was the F-15E 
with objective aircraft of F-22, F-35, and Air Force bombers (Department of Defense, 2007). 
The program office focused the two non-tradeable requirements of weapon load capacity and 
GPS interoperability, which was the intent to provide the warfighter an “80% solution” 
(Lorell et al., 2017, p. 43). The eventual program results of the SDB indicated a reduction of 
16% cost growth of the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC; Lorell et al., 2017). These 
program characteristics identify how the program office managed the successful increment 
and reduced cost growth. Thus, the well-defined requirements and mature technology 
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enabled SDB I increment’s success of maintaining cost, schedule (illustrated in Figure 2), 
and performance. 
 
Figure 2.  SDB Increment I Schedule. Source: Department of Defense 
(2007). 
SDB II increment was a separate program due to complexity and size, which is a 
common practice for most MDAPs. SDB II began the technology development phase while 
the SDB I was in full-rate production (Department of Defense, 2007). The mission for SDB 
II is to provide the warfighter the capability to attack mobile targets in adverse weather 
conditions in day and night. In addition, the threshold aircraft for the SDB II increased to 
include the F-15E, F-35B, and F-35C (Department of Defense, 2017). An increase in the 
SDB II’s ability to attack mobile targets and the option to use SDB II on additional platforms 
are improvements from SDB I. The program is moving toward operational testing with issues 
in the government confidence testing and F-35 program delays. However, the program does 
not have any Nunn-McCurdy or APB breaches at this time (Department of Defense, 2017). 
The SDB II schedule (illustrated in Figure 3) utilized the mature technology and lessons 
learned from SDB I to maintain cost and schedule even as the program moves through issues 
with new platform integration.  
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Figure 3.  SDB Increment II Schedule. Source: Department of Defense 
(2017). 
The success of the SDB demonstrates how the use of an incremental approach assists 
in management of cost, schedule, and performance. The RAND Corporation’s analysis on 
Air Force MDAPs with extreme cost growth provided critical insights into their two 
characteristics for program execution. Realistic cost estimates prior to MS B and incremental 
strategies enable programs to avoid Nunn-McCurdy and APB breaches. The Small Diameter 
Bomb increments are examples of how an EA strategy with an incremental approach can 
assist program offices with adhering to cost, schedule, and performance constraints. 
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III. JOINT MISSILE SYSTEMS CASE STUDY 
The intent of Chapter III is to examine an existing MDAP and identify critical system 
inputs that guide the development of an acquisition strategy. The chapter outlines specific 
components of the Joint Common Missile (JCM) program. Critical inputs include a 
description of the need and purpose of the JCM, user requirements for the weapon system, 
technology risks, schedule considerations, and budget inputs. In addition, this chapter 
highlights the transition of the JCM to the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM). An analysis 
of the JAGM’s critical inputs of purpose, requirements, risks, schedule, and budget inputs 
was necessary to understand how the weapons system evolved over time. Analysis in Chapter 
III assists the researchers in understanding how acquisition professionals may utilize critical 
program inputs to develop an acquisition strategy that employs EA with an incremental 
approach.  
A. JCM 
The Army and Navy conducted a capabilities-based assessment to identify numerous 
capability gaps where the year 2000 assets could not achieve an overmatch. An in-depth 
analysis of alternatives (AoA) scrutinized the eight different capability gaps (Sleevi & 
Mount, 2003): 
1. Destroy targets that were either time-sensitive or mobile in urban or complex 
terrain.  
2. Destroy covered targets at extended ranges with minimal collateral damage.  
3. Effectively counter battlefield effects of typical obscurants such as smoke or 
fires.  
4. Communicate and designate weapons systems effectively in complex or 
mountainous terrain.  
5. Avoid susceptibility to enemy counterattack due to long exposure time of 
effective shots on target. 
6. Attain logistics simplicity in using a single missile with different seeker types 
and targeting capabilities instead of using multiple missiles. 
7. Target high-speed water craft and other non-traditional targets with the array 
of legacy air-to-ground missions.  
8. Overcome low cloud ceilings and adverse weather (Sleevi & Mount, 2003).  
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These capability gaps highlighted the importance of a solution capable of effectively 
operating in complex terrain and targeting a multitude of targets. A new air-to-ground missile 
provided a materiel solution to counter each of these capability gaps. A joint missile provided 
an overall reduction in the logistic footprint for the services, and the missile required a 
multipurpose seeker and warhead with a propulsion system to provide the capability over a 
large range. 
As a result of these capability gaps, in October 2001 the JCM program began to 
provide a joint missile for rotary and fixed-wing platforms of the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps, and the target sets ranged from tanks and watercraft to bunkers and buildings (Joint 
Attack Munition Systems Project Office, 2016). The overarching goal of the JCM program 
was to use a modular open system for upgrades, obtain missile commonality, and reduce the 
logistic requirements to decrease life-cycle costs (Common Missile Project Office, 2003). 
These armed services identified a need for “an extended range, precision guided, air-to-
surface weapon providing both precision point target and fire-and-forget capability to be 
employed against targets in day, night, obscured battlefield, and adverse weather conditions” 
(Common Missile Project Office, 2003, p. iv). The operational need required a materiel 
solution that employed multiple advanced technologies. The significant capability gaps 
provided the reason to develop an advanced weapons system such as the JCM. 
1. Capabilities Development Document 
The JCM program was the first to become a program of record within the DOD’s new 
capabilities-driven Joint Capabilities and Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process in early 2003. The U.S. Army was the lead service and program participant for the 
JCM, alongside the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the British Army Air Corps. The 
JCM Program Management Office (PMO) personnel assisted the Army and Navy 
requirement lead offices to develop the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), analysis of 
alternatives (AoA), and Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved pursuing a materiel solution to the 
capabilities gap outlined in the JCM ICD. The AoA quantified performance measures and 
requirements for the CDD, later validated by the JROC (Mortlock, 2005).  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy  - 19 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
2. Requirements 
Five key performance parameters (KPPs) outlined the critical requirements that the 
users developed for the missile system. The KPPs listed in the CDD were targeting 
capability, combat effectiveness/reliability, missile range, interoperability, and 
carrier/shipboard operability (Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 2004). The 
requirements were critical during all contractor design, development, fabrication, testing, and 
qualifying of the JCM (Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 2004). 
The users required that the JCM contain three separate targeting methods. Precision 
Point Targeting (PPT), Fire and Forget (F&F) (Passive), and F&F (Active) were the three 
targeting methods. The targeting capability requirement quantifies hit probabilities for each 
of the targeting methods within a threshold and objective range. The PPT targeting method 
utilizes the JCM’s seeker to identify, track, and guide the missile toward a friendly 
designated laser spot. This method enables multiple targeting platforms to use appropriate 
laser guidance for a single JCM missile to target. The F&F (Passive) targeting method uses 
infrared (IR) identification and tracking capabilities within the seeker. A target’s IR signature 
is used to help guide the missile towards the intended hit point. This targeting method allows 
for JCM use during low ceiling and adverse weather conditions. F&F (Active) targeting 
method uses radar guidance from hardware affixed to the launch platform. The launching 
platform’s radar identifies, tracks, and guides the single JCM missile to the intended target 
(JROC, 2004). 
The combat effectiveness/reliability KPP quantifies requirements for specific types of 
single-shot kill probabilities and defines different walled target types. The single-shot kill 
probabilities are broken into objective and threshold levels for T90 variant tank targets and 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT)–type walls. The KPP requirement separated 
the MOUT wall targets into two types of material based on objective and threshold 
requirements. “Brick over Block” was designated as the threshold criteria, and “Triple Brick” 
material was designated as the objective criteria (JROC, 2004). 
The missile range KPP outlined the minimum and maximum ranges required by the 
missile. The requirement separates both the minimum and maximum ranges into fixed-wing 
and rotor-wing launch platform categories. Minimum range requirements help to support 
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targeting and firing on close in targets likely found in an urban environment. Maximum 
range requirement allows fixed-wing launch platforms, specifically fighter aircraft, to engage 
targets at higher speeds.  
Interoperability encompassed the last two KPPs. The interoperability requirement 
identifies specific aircraft type at the threshold and objective levels. The threshold platforms 
were American rotor and fixed-wing type aircraft. The AH-64D Apache, AH-1Z Cobra, F/A-
18 E/D Hornet, and MH-60R Seahawk made up the list of threshold aircraft. The objective 
platforms included more American rotor/fixed-wing aircraft as well as U.K. platforms. The 
final KPP ensures the JCM is compatible and capable of carrier/shipboard operations without 
detracting from other surrounding naval operations.  
3. Work Breakdown Structure 
Systems engineers develop work breakdown structures (WBSs) to link work required 
on each subcomponent to produce the final product. Shown in Figure 4, the JCM PMO 
developed the WBS into three levels (Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2003). The 
JCM’s first level encompasses the JCM Integrated System, which branches off into the 
missile Platform & Launcher, and Supportability & Training. The second level of the WBS 
breaks out the major elements of the defense materiel item. The JCM’s second level centers 
around Missile Integration and is tied directly to the JCM Integrated System. Integrated 
Flight Simulation branches off Missile Integration. The third level of the WBS identifies 
major subordinate elements of each second level major element. The JCM’s third level 
breaks down the missile subsystems into Seeker Integration and its separate components, 
Warhead, Propulsion, and Guidance & Control.   
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Figure 4.  JCM Work Breakdown Structure 
4. Risk Assessment 
The JCM program office conducted a thorough risk assessment to determine the 
program’s high-risk technologies in June 2003. The PMO used the WBS to determine the 
most critical JCM components with the highest risk. The initial risk assessment illustrates the 
WBS traceability of requirements to the risk level of each critical technology element (Figure 
5; Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2003). Since the main components of the weapon 
system were the seeker, warhead, and propulsion system, the most critical technologies of the 
program aligned with those areas. The three most critical technology elements were the 
seeker integration, propulsion turn down ratios, and the multipurpose warhead’s low 
length/diameter (Common Missile Project Office, 2003).  
 Figure 5 highlights the outcome of the 2003 in-depth risk assessment. A collection of 
nearly 70 technical experts, acquisition professionals, and users conducted a four-day risk 
assessment lockdown at Aberdeen Proving Ground to assess the JCM risk (Army Test and 
Evaluation Command, 2003). Prior to the lockdown meeting, the risk assessment participants 
conducted internal assessments from each stakeholder’s perspective. The intent of the 
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assessments prior to the lockdown was to enable consensus building at lockdown, begin work 
risk assessment issues beforehand, and establish conditions for the risk assessment at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground.  
The risk assessment focused on each component and subcomponent areas of the JCM, 
and the structure of the overall risk assessment aligned with the WBS levels. The first level 
was the JCM integrated system risk; the second level focused on platform and launcher 
interoperability, supportability and training, and missile integration; and the third level 
provided an analysis of each missile subsystem and integrated flight simulation. Risk 
assessments on each component and subcomponent identified the change in expected risk 
levels over the course of the program. The lockdown participants utilized the Army Materiel 
Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) methodology to determine the likelihood of a 
component’s or subcomponent’s technology’s ability to mature (Army Test and Evaluation 
Command, 2003). For example, if the component or subcomponent technology is developed 
and mature, then the rating for the risk likelihood of occurrence would be low. The 
consequence rating of a component’s and subcomponent’s risk follows the DOD 
methodology of determining the impact on cost, schedule, and performance. A low rating has 
a minimal impact while a high rating has an unacceptable impact on the program’s cost, 
schedule, and performance. The intersection of these two ratings gives the integrated rating 
for each component or subcomponent’s risk level according to the Risk Assessment Guide 
shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  Risk Assessment Guide Matrix. Source: Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (2003). 
As a result, the ratings ranged from low to high at critical milestones throughout the 
program. The lockdown participants determined how the component and subcomponent risk 
would burn down during the program’s life through events such as test and evaluation and 
modeling and simulation. The lockdown output follows the initial risk determination in 2003 
through MS C and reflects the overall JCM WBS structure by component and subcomponent 
(see Figure 6). Initial assessments identified the warhead and missile integration as having 
the highest impact on the overall system integration risk. This in-depth risk assessment 
provided a useful illustration of the risk assessment by component and subcomponent. As a 
result, all stakeholders obtained a shared understanding, and the assessment remained a 
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Figure 6.  JCM Risk by WBS Level. Source: Army Test and Evaluation Command (2003).
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During the JCM MS B brief, the JCM Program Office identified six major program 
risks, which are displayed in Figure 7 (Joint Common Missile Program Office, 2004). The 
seeker encompasses the JCM’s requirement to operate in three different modes. The modes 
include the ability for Precision Point Targeting, F&F (Passive), and F&F (Active). The 
seeker risks were broken down into two critical technology elements, which were the seeker 
dome and seeker software. Propulsion turn down ratios related to the missile’s ability to 
change propulsion geometry for a boost and sustain phase. These firing phases were 
necessary to fire the missile from both fixed and rotary-wing platforms at different ranges. 
Multipurpose warhead fuse technology was critical because the missile needed to hit an array 
of targets from a T-90 tank to a triple brick wall in a MOUT environment. In addition, the 
length and diameter of the warhead could have a significant impact on the missile’s ability to 
penetrate armor or buildings (Common Missile Project Office, 2003).  
The two remaining risks were missile integration and platform integration. The 
missile integration focused on the software’s ability to control the flight and operation of the 
missile for its intended target. Platform integration was critical because the JCM needed to 
fire from fixed and rotary-wing platforms from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps (Joint 
Common Missile Program Office, 2004). 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are necessary for a program to assess maturity 
of critical technology elements. Programs need a TRL of 6 to demonstrate system readiness 
prior to MS B. An independent technology assessment by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Science & Technology subject matter experts determined that the multipurpose 
warhead, seeker, and propulsion technology elements were at a TRL 6 before MS B based on 
a successful competitive technology development phase (Joint Common Missile Program 
Office, 2004). In addition, the risk assessment utilized an evaluation of the likelihood and 
consequence to determine an appropriate risk level. The likelihood relates to the probability 
of an inadequate technical performance, and the consequence of the failure on the program’s 
cost, schedule, or performance.  
The program office’s risk assessment made the following assessments based on 
technology maturity and integration difficulty. The multipurpose warhead fuze and missile 
integration were medium/high risk with a likelihood of occurrence rating of 3 and 
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consequence of 5. The propulsion technology was a medium risk with a likelihood of 2 and 
consequence of 4. Platform integration and seeker software were medium risks with a 
likelihood of 3 and consequence of 4. The seeker dome was a medium risk having a 
likelihood of 4 and consequence of 3. See the JCM risk assessment in Figure 7, which 
provides a visual representation of the program office risk assessment prior to MS B (Joint 
Common Missile Program Office, 2004).  
 
Figure 7.  JCM Program Risk. Source: Joint Common Missile Program 
Office (2004). 
5. Program Constraints 
Before the JCM became a program of record, several constraints were placed in the 
CDD that affected cost and schedule elements of the program. The CDD, approved April 12, 
2004, outlined the user’s need of achieving a target initial operational capability (IOC) in 
2009 (JROC, 2004). The target IOC played to the favor of the joint cost proposal (JCP), as it 
estimated the engineering and manufacturing development phase to be 48 months long 
(Gregory, 2004). Furthermore, the CDD discussed program affordability in terms of the 
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acquisition unit procurement cost (AUPC). Using the JCP as a baseline, the CDD identified 
the JCM AUPC to be $108,000 with a multiyear contract vehicle and $120,000 without a 
multiyear contract vehicle (JROC, 2004). The inclusion of this information into the CDD 
would likely influence the MDA’s establishment of the PM’s APB.  
Interestingly, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) approved an 
independent cost estimate (ICE) for the JCM MS B review the same month the CDD was 
approved. In it, the CAIG estimated the development phase to be 74 months and having the 
potential to increase as high as 147 months; a difference of 39% with the JCP. AUPC 
estimates were also higher at $153,000, a difference of approximately 22% with the JCP 
(Burke, 2004). As evidenced by the PM’s APB, the differences between the JCP and CAIG 
ICE did not garner enough attention to address.  
6. Acquisition Strategy Report  
The program acquisition strategy report (ASR) outlined the design and development 
plan of the JCM in accordance with the then current DODI 5000.02 dated May 12, 2003, and 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) dated November 22, 2002 (Common Missile Project 
Office, 2003). Approved in September 2003, the ASR identified the JCM program as having 
an overall EA approach through the use of increments. Increment 1 was to provide full 
performance threshold capability as noted in the CDD, as well as provide versatility for use 
on fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. As a result, the ASR’s primary focus was on the first 
increment of capability. A second increment that forecasted the development of an anti-
radiation homing (ARH) variant had been identified but was not discussed in detail 
(Common Missile Project Office, 2003). The program office planned to achieve full 
capability by using existing technologies and maturing them to meet the needs of established 
KPPs. Furthermore, a combination of Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), Fixed-Price Incentive 
Fee (FPIF), and Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) contract types were templated to incentivize 
contractors and manage cost/risk sharing opportunities between the government and 
commercial firms.  
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a. Acquisition Strategy (Schedule) 
The JCM was designed to be a modular system and structured to maximize 
commonality among rotary and fixed-wing applications (Common Missile Project Office, 
2003). Focused on the first increment of capability, the PMO used a multi-phased acquisition 
approach by planning for two development phases of the program’s system development and 
demonstration (SDD) phase. The first phase of SDD concentrated on mitigating component 
risk by incorporating a combination of testing and design reviews. This phase was templated 
to last 12 to 14 months and would be considered successful upon completion of seeker design 
verification, meeting control test vehicle (CTV) test objectives on track missile design, 
development of a system design interface control document and a completed preliminary 
design review (PDR; Common Missile Project Office, 2003). The subsequent phase was 
templated to last 36 months. The SDD phase focused on the integration of JCM 
subcomponents into the overall system and intended to demonstrate the system’s ability to 
meet all CDD requirements. However, in the first quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, the JCM 
program was terminated while in the first phase of SDD (Joint Attack Munition Systems 
Project Office, 2015). 
B. JOINT AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILE 
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 terminated the JCM program in the first quarter 
of FY 2005 due to budget constraints. The JROC instructed the JCM Project Office (PO) to 
continue maturing key technology with Lockheed Martin and planned a restart for the 
program in FY 2007 (Joint Attack Munition Systems Project Office, 2016). Prior to 2007, the 
PO and Lockheed Martin completed a preliminary design review (PDR), and conducted a 
controlled test vehicle flight, along with more than 3,500 hours of hardware and software 
testing, and more than 1,000,000 integrated flight simulation runs on missile prototypes. The 
JCM PO and the Aviation Rockets and Missiles PO merged to form the Joint Attack 
Munition Systems (JAMS) PO in FY 2007. Soon after formation, the JAMS office began 
building an AS for a new acquisition category (ACAT) 1 program called the JAGM (Joint 
Attack Munitions Systems Project Office, 2016). 
The JAGM program continues where the JCM technology development (TD) phase 
left off. The JAGM PO continued developing key technologies from 2008 to 2010, after the 
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JCM technology maturation and program closeout. The JAGM PO based development of key 
technologies on the same requirements that outlined the need for JCM production. The 
JAGM CDD, approved in January 2013, differs from the JCM CDD by outlining a program 
that has an incremental requirement following an EA approach to reach full capability 
through three increments (JAGM Product Office, 2014). The CDD states the JAGM strategy 
addresses Increment-One capabilities for the JAGM. Increment-Two will 
address increases in range, possible inclusion of limited Imaging InfraRed 
(IIR) for terminal guidance/hit point selection, and other items as 
technology/schedule can accommodate. Increment-Three will provide full tri-
mode seeker capabilities for active and passive engagements as well as an 
increase in range. (JROC, 2012, p. 14) 
1. Requirements 
The JAGM CDD contains the same KPPs as the JCM and includes targeting 
capability, combat effectiveness/reliability, range, interoperability, and carrier/shipboard 
operability with sustainability (materiel availability) as the only new KPP included in the 
JAGM CDD (Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 2012). The biggest differences 
between the JCM and JAGM KPPs were the inclusion of increments that separated the 
different threshold requirements for each KPP. Multiple parameters changed from a threshold 
element in the JCM program to objective level elements for the JAGM. 
The targeting capability KPP changed only slightly by identifying the specific 
differences between the F&F active and passive requirements. Threshold values in 
Increments 2 and 3 and the Objective values contain F&F passive threshold values against 
stationary targets only. Increment 1 only contains a Precision Point Targeting and F&F 
(Active) seeker capability. 
Combat effectiveness/reliability requirements included in-flight reliability (Post P-Bit 
Check) threshold and objective values. The Increment 1 threshold includes initial fielding 
and system maturity values for the in-flight reliability, with Increments 2 and 3 containing 
the same values. The Objective value increases the reliability. The other requirements in the 
combat effectiveness/reliability KPP are the same parameters with different threshold values 
spread over the different increments and objective elements.  
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Range requirements for Increment 1 reduced the maximum rotary-wing range to 8km 
instead of 16km in the JCM CDD. Increment 2 maximum range changed to “greater than 
8km,” with Increment 3 improving to 16km. Fixed-wing ranges are not required for the 
JAGM except for the Objective values because of the changes to the Interoperability KPP. 
The interoperability KPP contained the biggest changes between the JCM and JAGM. 
The AH-64D Apache and AH-1Z Cobra helicopters are the only two aircraft identified as 
platforms for firing the JAGM in all Increment threshold values. The F/A-18 E/F Hornet and 
MH-60R Seahawk moved to the other Objective level aircraft so that Increments 1–3 are for 
the two rotary-wing aircraft only.  
Carrier/shipboard operability requirements stayed the same, and the last KPP for 
JAGM that is new is the sustainability (materiel availability) requirement. The KPP describes 
a required percentage of missiles operationally capable of performing an assigned mission at 
a given time, based on materiel condition. Increment 1 establishes the same threshold values 
for Increments 2 and 3, with the Objective level increasing the percentage required. 
2. Risks and Risk Management 
In 2010, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA[ALT]) review team conducted a Technology Readiness Assessment 
(TRA) to review the technology maturity following TD. The two contractors developed 
materiel solutions for the original JCM requirements up until the TRA. The review team 
determined that the TRL for the new rocket motor, warhead, and tri-mode seeker/guidance 
section were either a 5 or 6. The prototype technology of the original JCM requirements were 
too immature, which could impact the program’s cost. Therefore, the program office utilized 
trade space evaluations to develop an alternative materiel solution with using the Hellfire 
Romeo backend with a multi-mode seeker for two rotary-wing aircraft. The JAGM program 
office conducted a risk assessment that evaluated the program risks for the adjusted material 
solution (see Figure 8; JAGM Product Office, 2014). Compared to the JCM, the JAGM risk 
assessment did not focus on the development critical technology elements from inception 
because the technology matured over time from previous TD phases, and the reduced 
capability utilized existing technology for the dual mode seeker and propulsion system. The 
program office conducted a risk assessment for the Engineering, Manufacturing, and 
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Development (EMD) phase to identify integration and manufacturing issues, and to test asset 
availability.  
The first program risk is the Guidance Section (GS) qualification for the JAGM. 
Guidance Section pertains to the dual mode seeker with precision point and F&F (Active) 
modes. The design maturity of the GS poses a risk to the cost and schedule of the program. 
The evaluation determined the likelihood of occurrence as a 2 and the consequence as a 3. 
Therefore, the overall risk evaluation of the GS was a low rating. The interface of the 
software and hardware to ensure GS qualification required mitigation through testing and 
simulation of the contractor’s design. 
The platform qualification was the second risk as a result of availability of launch 
assets. The risk was a threat to the program schedule because test asset availability could 
delay testing. Since the JAGM utilizes the Hellfire backend, the missile would have no issues 
firing from the existing Apache or Cobra platforms. The program office evaluated the risk as 
a likelihood rating of 1 and consequence of 4, which results in a low risk to the program.  
The third risk was the producibility, or yield, of the JAGM. The program office 
identified the risk to ensure the missile could meet production rate and quality requirements. 
If the contractor had inadequate production or quality process maturity, then the schedule 
could potentially breach. The program office would conduct maintenance readiness level 
MRL assessments and ensure the contractor demonstrated maturity to an evaluation level of 
8 before MS C. The likelihood of this risk was 2, and the consequence was 3, which 
determined a low risk for the program.  
The fourth EMD program risk was in-flight reliability for the missile. The program 
office identified this risk on the possibility of missile failure during flight. During the EMD, 
there were 48 firings scheduled to evaluate and mitigate this risk with only two failures 
expected. The program office would mitigate the risk through additional testing and 
corrective action and would use previous Hellfire missile reliability data. The likelihood of 
occurrence was 3 with a consequence of 4, which made the in-flight reliability a medium risk 
for the program (JAGM Product Office, 2014). 
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Figure 8.  JAGM Risk Assessment. Source: JAGM Product Office (2014). 
3. Acquisition Strategy (Schedule) 
The program AS, approved on October 2014, outlines the EMD phase and low rate 
initial production LRIP strategy for Increment 1 of the JAGM program. Like the JCM, the 
JAGM AS identifies the use of an EA approach through the delivery of capabilities in 
increments. Comparatively, Increment 1 for the JAGM was not designed to provide full 
threshold capability, but rather to establish a modular system capable of receiving future 
upgrades. The EMD phase of Increment 1 sought to mate a multi-mode seeker with the 
backend of the Hellfire missile. The conclusion to use government furnished equipment 
(GFE) resulted from multiple trade space evaluations identifying the use of the Hellfire 
Romeo backend as the most economical materiel solution. Furthermore, Increment 1 focused 
on system modularity, which facilitated the use of a Modular and Open Systems Architecture 
(MOSA) to accommodate future increments with the ability to insert technology (JAGM 
Product Office, 2014).  
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C. JCM AND JAGM PROGRAM SUMMARY 
 From 2005 to 2015, the JCM program endured cancellation, re-establishment as the 
JAGM program, and a subsequent second cancellation. More recently, the restructuring of 
the JAGM program into increments has resulted in the delay of performance requirements, 
relating to development of a tri-mode seeker, multipurpose warhead, and common motor, to 
follow on increments. As such, the first increment of the current JAGM program seeks to 
develop a dual-mode seeker and mate it with the backend of a Hellfire missile. Figure 9 
provides a snapshot comparison of the two programs over a 10-year period. To avoid the 
same “lost decade” on future programs, the research points to the need for a survey to elicit 
feedback from acquisition professionals. The survey intends to provide insight on what 
program elements acquisition professionals consider critical in developing a program 
acquisition strategy. Chapter IV provides a detailed explanation of the methodology used in 
creating a survey based off these needs.  
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Figure 9.  JCM and JAGM Comparison 
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IV. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
To answer the question “How difficult is it to develop a successful incremental 
acquisition approach for defense acquisition programs?,” this thesis’s research is used to 
develop a survey that collects and evaluates acquisition professionals’ knowledge baseline of 
EA. Chapter IV describes the development of the survey and the format used for delivery to 
participants for completion. The survey uses the JCM program background information for 
participants to analyze when completing the survey’s acquisition strategy questions. This 
chapter describes that background and why the JCM is an appropriate topic to use in 
developing the survey. The end of the chapter reviews the expected feedback and data 
collected from survey results.   
A. DATA COLLECTION MEDIUM 
A survey format allows the collection of current acquisition professionals’ thoughts 
on acquisition strategies. Being able to query the field of individuals with knowledge of 
acquisition program strategies helps to identify current knowledge bases and understandings 
of the DOD’s preferred method of EA with incremental approaches. The survey collects 
personal data on the individual participant’s level of acquisition experience and education. 
The personal data enables the identification of which level of experience likely results in a 
higher understanding of acquisition strategies. 
An academic setting is the intended environment to administer the survey. 
Administering the survey during a pre or post-acquisition academic course timeframe is 
appropriate for instructors to gather feedback and evaluate a participant’s knowledge level. 
Institutions such as the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) or the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) allow instructors to gain an understanding of student’s acquisition strategy 
knowledge base and tailor lessons to push the DOD’s preferred methods. 
Figure 10 provides a visual depiction of how program inputs are translated by the 
survey participant into one of three acquisition strategy outputs. The survey incorporates 
program inputs relating to elements of cost, schedule, performance, risk, and technology 
readiness levels. It is understood that the PM would have access to this information to 
facilitate formulation of program-related decisions. When completing the survey, the 
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participant is presented with program inputs and prompted to choose from three expected 
outputs relating to the program schedule: single-block approach, two-increment approach, 
and three-increment approach.  
 
Adapted from Joint Common Missile Program Office (2004); Army Test and Evaluation Command 
(2003); JROC (2004); Common Missile Project Office (2003); Burke (2004); OUSD(AT&L) (2017a). 
Figure 10.  Acquisition Schedule Survey Model.  
B. JCM PROGRAM INPUTS 
As the DOD began to adjust the DOD 5000.01 series to guide acquisition 
professionals in program development, the JCM program came to fruition as an MDAP. As 
highlighted in Chapter II, the DOD focused on developing weapon programs in an EA 
approach with blocks or increments as highlighted in the NDAA for 2002 and 2003. The 
JCM was the first program of record with a JROC-approved CDD under the JCIDS process. 
Therefore, the need for the JCM arose during the shift in the DOD policy to develop weapon 
systems in an EA approach. The cancellation of the JCM program, and then its reinstatement 
as the JAGM program, demonstrated how some trade-offs were made to account for cost, 
schedule, and performance considerations. For this research, the initial JCM estimates and 
assessments were the critical components to developing a survey, which ultimately was used 
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to determine how difficult it is to successfully implement an incremental acquisition 
approach for a defense weapons program.  
Critical JCM program information provided the necessary inputs to develop a survey 
that analyzes an acquisition professional’s thought process when generating a program 
schedule. As a highly complex system dependent upon improved software and technology 
with component and platform integration considerations, the JCM program possessed many 
factors to consider when developing a strategy. In addition, the JCM program had a joint cost 
proposal and IOC, while the CAIG had a different estimate for the average unit procurement 
cost AUPC and schedule estimates. These estimates are inputs a program manager must 
consider and justify for developing a proper acquisition strategy. The program office also 
conducted a thorough risk assessment that tied the requirements to high risk critical 
technology elements through the WBS. These program elements provided the critical inputs 
for designing the survey to elicit responses from acquisition professionals that help to 
determine the difficulty in developing an incremental approach for an acquisition strategy. 
Adjustment of some JCM information was necessary to simplify critical technology 
explanations and requirements to make it easier for the participant to understand.   
C. SURVEY FORMAT 
To create a logical flow, the survey comprises several distinct sections, each aimed to 
either provide information to or request input from the user. The following headings were 
used to categorize each section: Participant Demographics, Instructions, Situation, Draft APB 
Information, Survey Questions, and Participant Feedback. The following paragraphs provide 
a description of each survey section.  
1. Participant Demographics 
The Participant Demographics section of the survey requests the user to choose from 
a defined selection of rank/grade, experience, and educational options (Figure 11). This 
section is used to gather participant demographic information for comparative use when a 
statistically relevant sample size can be achieved through future dissemination. An example 
of how this information could be used is that the data collected could highlight whether a 
specific pay grade or education level possesses a better understanding of implementing an 
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incremental acquisition approach during schedule development. Specific personal 
identifiable information is not in the participant demographics section or the overall survey. 
 
Figure 11.  Participant Demographic Selection 
2. Instructions 
The Instructions section outlines the objective of the survey taker in the simple format 
of task, conditions, and standard. The directions clearly articulate how the survey taker must 
analyze the provided JCM system inputs, use critical thinking, determine what acquisition 
approach to follow for program development given the draft APB, and provide reasoning for 
decisions or trade-offs made during the survey. The instructions establish the conditions and 
time constraints for the survey in a classroom environment. The survey taker should have a 
clear understanding of expectations for the survey after reading the instructions.  
3. Situation 
In the Situation section, a detailed description of the acquisition environment is 
necessary to create realistic context for the JCM program for the survey taker. Most of the 
information for this research is from the JCM prior to cancellation; therefore, the situation 
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places the survey taker in the role as the PM prior to MS B and awaiting the award of an 
EMD contract. Background on the maturation of critical technology, approved JCIDS 
documents, and estimates provide additional context for the program inputs. This section also 
describes the importance and urgency of the need for the JCM to replace the Maverick, 
Hellfire, and TOW to decrease the logistic footprint and life-cycle costs with improved 
capability. The survey taker should understand the current state and importance of the JCM 
upon reading this section. 
4. Draft APB  
The Draft APB section presents cost, schedule, and performance information for the 
participant’s consideration in developing their acquisition strategy. The following paragraphs 
describe in detail what information is presented to the user. 
a. CDD Performance Requirements  
To account for the varying degrees of acquisition professionals’ technical 
background, the simplification of technical requirements was necessary to provide more 
clarity to the survey taker. The targeting KPP for a tri-mode seeker is simplified and 
separated into the modes of precision point and F&F active or passive with simple 
explanation of the targeting mode as either laser, radar, or infrared designation. The combat 
effectiveness KPP relates to the need for a multipurpose warhead, which describes the 
different armor and antipersonnel requirements. The range and interoperability KPPs 
simplification was necessary to distinguish the missile functionality on different platforms. 
The addition of the physical dimension requirement was important for understanding the 
JCM size. The creation of the CDD performance requirements table in the survey provides 
the survey taker with a snapshot of the user requirements in simple terms (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  CDD Performance Requirements 
b. Schedule  
The Schedule section of the survey describes how the current program utilizes a 
single-step approach to system development. The schedule inputs are additional constraints 
the survey taker must consider, which align with the original JCM schedule requirements 
from the CDD. The explanation of schedule inputs is in terms of months or years in relation 
to MS B. This is a result of the situation for the survey taker acting as the PM just before a 
MS B decision and waiting to enter EMD. The services require the MS C in 48 months and 
IOC 60 months from MS B. The EMD estimate is from the original JCM schedule, and the 
CDD possessed the original IOC criteria for the services.  
c. Cost 
The program office estimates for the JCP are the inputs for the survey’s Cost section. 
The intent of this section is to provide the survey taker with an understanding of the average 
unit procurement cost (AUPC) for the JCM from the program office’s perspective and 
provide options before the MS B decision. The actual estimates were $108,000 with a multi-
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year contract and $120,000 without a multi-year contract for an acquisition objective of 
63,978 missiles. In addition, this section outlines a beneficial budgetary environment because 
of the program incorporation into the POM (Program Objective Memorandum) and full 
funding support for a 48-month EMD and 10-year production and development (P&D). The 
survey taker must account for these program office cost estimates and determine whether or 
not to implement the program office or CAIG estimates when determining the appropriate 
acquisition strategy.  
d. Work Breakdown Structure 
The intent of the Work Breakdown Structure section is to highlight the major 
components of the system. To simplify the original JCM WBS, the diagram was organized to 
show three levels with the bottom level being the three major components of the system. The 
seeker, warhead, and propulsion/rocket motor are the three major components of the JCM 
correlating with the system risks. The WBS presented in this manner illustrates to the survey 
taker how the requirements are linked to the system design. In addition, the diagram links the 
requirements with the program risks. The survey taker should understand the basic system 
design and potential trade-offs when observing the simplified JCM WBS (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Simplified Survey WBS 
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e. Risk Assessment 
The Risk Assessment section of the survey provides the participant with traceability 
of risk to the elements of the WBS (Figure 14). The intent of presenting the risk assessment 
in this manner is to highlight program risk by sub-component and allow the participant to 
visualize overall program risk. Like the simplified WBS, this section was simplified from 
actual program information in order to present data in a non-technical manner and account 
for participants whose knowledge base does not include that of a missile program.  
 
Figure 14.  Simplified Survey Risk Assessment 
f. Technology Readiness Levels 
The TRLs provided to the participant in this survey reflect that of the actual program. 
Each critical component of the JCM (multi-purpose warhead, common rocket motor, tri-
mode seeker) was assessed at TRL 6, an assessed level conducive with entering MS B for a 
program.  
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g. ICE and Affordability Assessment 
Program affordability is one of the more important elements of a defense acquisition 
program. Fiscal projections are typically accounted for in such items as the POM and Future 
Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and as such remain one of the binding elements for a PM to 
manage on a program. This informative section of the survey provides the participant with a 
simplified affordability assessment derived from the CAIG ICE. The inclusion of the CAIG’s 
estimate for program development and AUPC is aimed to generate thought on behalf of the 
participant. Discussed earlier, the CAIG estimate differs significantly from the JCP. It is up 
to the participant to discern whether this difference is significant enough to warrant 
requesting a change to the program APB.  
5. Survey Questions 
This section of the survey transitions from providing information to requesting 
information from the participant. Within it, the participant is prompted to make choices in 
regards to elements of program cost, schedule, and performance. At the conclusion of this 
section, the participant has effectively distilled the program information and translated it into 
acquisition strategy–related answers for the program.  
a. Strategy Selection 
The strategy selection question is the first JCM program–specific question the survey 
participant must answer (Figure 15). The answer to the strategy selection leads the participant 
to answer specific APB questions for the type of strategy they chose. Selecting answer “A” 
declares the participant chose “Single Block Acquisition Strategy (Section 1)” as their 
preferred acquisition strategy for the JCM program based on the situation and draft APB data 
given. Selecting answer “B” identifies that participant chose “Two Increments: Incremental 
Acquisition Strategy (Section 2)” as their preferred strategy. Selecting answer “C” indicates 
that the participant desires “Three Increments: Incremental Acquisition Strategy (Section 3)” 
as their preferred strategy. Once one of the three strategy types is chosen, the participant is 
directed to answer the APB questions in the section only pertaining to their desired 
acquisition strategy. Answering their section-specific acquisition questions allows the 
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participant to better explain their strategy decision for the JCM and the specific APB 
applications in their own view.  
 
Figure 15.  Acquisition Strategy Selection Question 
b. Single-Block Strategy 
If a survey participant selects the first answer of the strategy selection question, they 
indicate a desire for a “Single Block Acquisition Strategy (Section 1).” The survey directs the 
participant to answer only Section 1 acquisition questions, which pertain to a single-block 
strategy only. Section 1 has a total of four questions that pertain to the participant’s desired 
EMD phase length, AUPC amount, JCM capabilities, and options to address a strategy’s 
possible breach of the JCM program’s APB.   
Question 1 of Section 1 requires the participant to select a length of time for their 
strategy’s EMD phase (Figure 16). The question is a multiple-choice type and contains the 
three different time lengths of 48 months, 72 months, and 144 months for answers A through 
C, respectively. Answer D is an “Other” type of answer which allows the participant to write 
in a desired number of months for their strategy’s EMD phase length. Sub questions A and B 
following question 1 require the participant to justify the selection of time for their EMD 
phase and to address high-risk schedule concerns if the 48-month option is selected.  
The JCM situation and draft APB data given to the participant in the beginning 
section of the survey provide information that is critical when choosing EMD time length. 
The participant should understand critical events anticipated in the schedule section and 
analyze the capabilities of the JCM’s subcomponents and their capability for integration with 
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one another. The WBS and risk analysis are essential elements for the participant to compare 
with the schedule of critical events given.   
Question 2 of Section 1 requires the participant to select an amount of money for the 
JCM programs AUPC. Question 2 is a multiple-choice type and contains the three different 
monetary values of $108,000, which is the draft APB amount based on a multi-year contract; 
$120,000, which is the draft APB amount based on a single-year contract; and $153,000, 
which is what the CAIG ICE estimated in the situation section. The dollar figures are the 
options for answers A through C, respectively. Answer D is again another “Other” type of 
answer that allows the participant to write in a desired dollar amount for their strategy’s 
AUPC. 
Question 3 of Section 1 requires the participant to select which capabilities their 
strategy includes for the JCM’s initial production. The capabilities are broken up into the 
four categories of seeker, warhead, propulsion, and platform integrated. Question 3 is a 
check-box type question that allows the participant to choose as many of the options as they 
like. A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or key performance parameter (KPP) option is 
given for the seeker, warhead, and propulsion categories. The two different options allow the 
participant to analyze the JCM program’s risk analysis and tech maturity to better determine 
the likely capabilities included in the first JCMs produced.  
The platform integrated category allows the participants to choose the priority of the 
aircraft that will fire the JCM. The platform category requires analysis of the aircraft 
included as a part of the integration KPP and any information in the situation that could 
reduce the total amount of aircraft from the initial KPP list. The survey requires participants 
to explain how they expect to gain relief from not selecting all of the KPP-directed 
requirements.  
Question 4 of Section 1 is the final question and requires the participant to explain 
how they plan to address the affordability concerns and the high likelihood of cost and 
schedule breaches. Question 4 is a long, written answer that requires the participant to 
analyze the choices they made in order to determine what schedule and cost risks they need 
to mitigate.  
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Figure 16.  Example Single Block Survey Question 
c. Incremental Strategy: Two Increments 
Selecting option B, in the acquisition strategy selection question will direct 
participants to answer only the questions in Section 2 related to a two-increment acquisition 
strategy (Figure 15). Similar to Section 1, Section 2 has a total of four questions. However, 
each question now has a dual increment component to it pertaining to the desired EMD phase 
length, AUPC amount, JCM capabilities, and justification to address delaying the JCM by 
one year to realign requirements and funding. Figure 17 provides an example of a two-
increment strategy question.  
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Figure 17.  Example Two-Increment Survey Question 
Selection of the two-increment approach by the participant should provoke a deeper 
analysis. Compared to the single-block method, the participant now has to decide what length 
of development would best suit each increment, how that should affect the increment AUPC, 
and what capabilities each increment will address. As a byproduct of selecting this strategy, 
the PM would have to receive service approval to delay an MS B decision, obtain JROC 
CDD approval, and realign the service POM submission. The conclusion of this section 
requests the participant to elaborate on how they would navigate and obtain proper approvals 
to employ this strategy.  
d. Incremental Strategy: Three Increments 
This section addresses questions if a participant chooses a three-increment acquisition 
strategy. Similar to the two-increment approach section, the three-increment strategy 
provides for an additional increment to achieve the end-user’s requirements outlined in the 
CDD. Selection of this approach should provoke the deepest analysis compared to the two 
other acquisition strategy options. Figure 18 provides an example of a three-increment 
strategy question. 
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Figure 18.  Example Three-Increment Survey Question 
6. Participant Feedback 
The Participant Feedback section at the end of the survey allows the initial survey 
administrators to gather critical feedback on the content of the input data given and quality of 
the questions. Feedback from acquisition professionals allows the administrators to better 
understand the knowledge base of the survey takers and continue improving the content over 
time.   
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intent of this research is to answer the primary research question: How difficult is 
it to develop a successful incremental acquisition approach for a defense acquisition program 
(Acquisition Research Program, n.d.)? This research is based upon the history of EA and 
incremental approach development as the DOD’s preferred approach. An outline of the 
history behind the DOD’s acceptance of the incremental approach as policy highlighted the 
importance of an acquisition professional’s ability to implement the approach and adhere to 
DOD policy. In addition, the example of the Small Diameter Bomb demonstrated how an 
incremental approach could lead to a successful program and prevention of a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach. Even though there are successful examples such as the Small Diameter Bomb, some 
DOD programs still do not utilize an incremental approach or stay within cost, schedule, and 
performance. The research utilized the evolution of the JCM into the JAGM program as a 
case study with adequate program information. The JCM program had JROC-approved 
requirements documents, a detailed risk assessment, and thorough cost estimate; however, 
the DOD eventually canceled the program but brought it back to life years later as the 
JAGM. To answer the primary research question, JCM program information is used as inputs 
for a survey, whose elements potentially determine the difficulty of implementing an 
incremental approach. Initial feedback from acquisition professionals further refined the beta 
survey to assist research efforts. The following sections provide critical research findings and 
recommendations for further research to eventual survey distribution. 
A. REQUIREMENTS TO ANSWER THESIS QUESTION 
The research team decided to use a survey to provide a problem set to acquisition 
professionals, and eventually collection of data over a large population of the acquisition 
workforce. The target audience for the survey was program managers within the DOD 
acquisition. Upon publication of this research, future survey participants will provide the 
objective data to determine the difficulty of implementing the DOD policy for acquisition 
strategies. 
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B. RESULTS OF RESEARCH 
The research conducted for this thesis provided answers to the primary and secondary 
research questions detailed in Chapter I. DOD regulation and instruction documents, 
governmental reports, and past acquisition program data provided needed information about 
the history and implementation of EA with incremental approaches. The following section 
details data that helped answer the primary and secondary questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question for this thesis asks how difficult it is to develop a 
successful incremental acquisition approach for defense acquisition programs (Acquisition 
Research Program, n.d.).  Future survey administrators will provide answers to the primary 
research question with survey results and analysis. The survey created during the research for 
this thesis’s primary question will be beneficial for future data collection of acquisition 
professional’s understanding of the DOD Acquisition preferred approach. Acquisition subject 
matter experts reviewed the preliminary survey and concluded it can and will address the 
thesis’ primary research question.  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
The first of the secondary research questions asks about the history of EA and an 
incremental development approach. A foundational look at the history of the idea of EA and 
an incremental approach highlighted how the technique became DOD policy. Previous 
Congressional legislation such as the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, NDAA from the 
1980s through the 2000s, and DOD 5000.01 and 5000.02 policies dating back to the early 
1990s established the historical context of DOD acceptance of EA with an incremental 
approach. The research analyzed the JCM and JAGM program to gather realistic information 
for survey development. The use of the information from these programs provides credibility 
to the survey since the JROC approved the requirements and achieved a successful MS B.  
The secondary research question that asks how effective the DOD is at implementing 
an EA strategy with an incremental approach is partially answered by two GAO reports 
completed in 2014 and 2016. The 2014 GAO report titled Agencies Need to Establish and 
Implement Incremental Development Policies revealed one of 37 DOD programs planned to 
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deliver functionality every six months (Government Accountability Office, 2014). The GAO 
report outlines the need for incremental approaches, especially in IT intensive programs and 
long-term system development projects. The lack of incremental strategies led the GAO to 
continue reporting on the use of the important acquisition strategy.  
The GAO report titled Agencies Need to Increase Their Use of Incremental 
Development Practices details the total DOD information technology (IT) intensive programs 
in 2015 and 2016 that utilized an incremental approach (Government Accountability Office, 
2016). The DOD’s reporting on their primary IT-intensive programs to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) inconclusively details the effectiveness of their program’s 
incremental strategies. The GAO reported the DOD has one of the lowest rates among 
government agencies for using incremental acquisition approaches. However, reporting 
discrepancies outlined in the DOD rebuttal explain a breakdown of status reporting to the 
OMB about incremental strategies used and a planned approach to increase reporting 
accuracy in the future.  
The DOD’s effective implementation of EA strategies with incremental approaches 
cannot be conclusively answered due to the lack of data consolidated on past acquisition 
programs. The current means of extracting the data needed to answer the secondary question 
are not used to the maximum potential. A strong emphasis required for reporting and 
consolidating the DOD’s use of evolutionary strategies does not exist.   
The third secondary research question requires an example of a successful 
implementation of an incremental approach. The Small Diameter Bomb program, outlined in 
Chapter II, describes an effective and successful incremental approach to an MDAP. The 
RAND study also outlined in Chapter II detailed the incremental approach taken to the SDB 
program, which led to lower costs and zero APB breaches.  
The fourth secondary research question asks how the JCM program evolved into the 
JAGM program. After reviewing program-specific information, this question is answered in 
Chapter III of the thesis. Additionally, Figure 19 provides a visual depiction of the program’s 
evolution.  
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Figure 19.  Evolution of the JCM Program. Source: Joint Attack Munition 
Systems Project Office (2015). 
The final secondary research question asks to what extent acquisition professionals 
understand program risks and the necessity of using an incremental approach. The 
preliminary survey allows future administrators to alter risk and TRL levels to better analyze 
acquisition professional’s baseline knowledge for managing program risk.  Alteration of 
these inputs allows administrators to identify participants’ thresholds for selecting an 
incremental approach.   The survey created during this thesis’s research helps to identify the 
knowledge base and emphasis acquisition professionals put on strategies with evolutionary 
and incremental approaches. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEY 
Effective guidance, basic participant information, and situational context provide 
survey participants with an idea of the survey expectations. The situation explains how the 
survey participant has inherited the JCM program prior to MS B and is awaiting EMD 
contract approval, and provides the operational concept and urgency of the program. The 
inputs for the survey included a draft APB that included requirements, cost and schedules 
estimates, WBS, risk assessment tied to the requirements, technology readiness levels, ICE, 
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and affordability assessments. Survey participants must internalize the inputs and decide on a 
single step, two increments, or three increments for the program schedule. This selection and 
the rationale for selection provides critical information to the survey administrator for the 
issues with implementing an incremental acquisition strategy. The survey provides the best 
medium for data collection and further analysis into the primary research question.  
The software program, Google Forms, helped create a digital version of the survey as 
an alternate medium for disbursement and data analysis. Using Google Forms to create a 
digital format allows survey administrators to easily consolidate and analyze responses from 
participants. The Google program proves to be very user-friendly for the survey creator and 
administrator. Being free of charge, Google Forms has a better price point than many other 
survey programs and performs well with this research’s type of questioning. 
D. PRELIMINARY CRITICAL FEEDBACK (JAGM SOLUTION ANSWER) 
Preliminary editorial feedback received from acquisition subject matter experts 
mostly pertained to clarification of survey content and expectations for questions from future 
survey participants. The survey does not have a specified correct answer to the strategy type 
and corresponding questions. However, a survey participant who chooses the strategy type 
and answers questions that are closest to resembling the JAGM program and its incremental 
strategy is considered to have correctly predicted the most appropriate outcome.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations facilitate follow-on research to further analyze acquisition 
professional’s propensity to implement an incremental approach during acquisition strategy 
development. The survey handover and future distribution enables survey administrators a 
platform to collect data. Survey adjustment and additional versions provide the ability to 
change inputs to determine whether different program inputs elicit participants to utilize an 
incremental approach. The final recommendation highlights potential incentives to increase 
the survey participation. Further details of the recommendations are presented in the 
following sections.   
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1. Future Distribution  
To gather feedback necessary to analyze and answer the thesis question, the survey 
requires distribution to a target audience of acquisition professionals. Initially, it is 
recommended to limit distribution of the survey to acquisition professionals undergoing 
training at service equivalent educational institutions such as the Army Acquisition Center of 
Excellence (AACoE) and Senior Service College (SSC). Doing this provides control of 
survey distribution and guarantees a means of data collection. Through collaboration with the 
respective service institution, the survey can be incorporated into the program of instruction 
with adequate time allocated for its completion. Time allocation is especially important as the 
survey is estimated to take 45 to 60 minutes to complete.  
After achieving an adequate baseline of feedback through service institutions, 
consideration should be given to expanding distribution of the survey to all DOD acquisition 
professionals. It is acknowledged that the current form of the survey is extensive; therefore, 
future distribution should be tailored to minimize impacts on professionals performing their 
duties. This is achieved through reducing survey justification requirements from the 
participant.  
2. Future Versions of the Survey 
Variable information of the survey includes the risk assessment, technology readiness 
levels, and ICE and affordability assessment. The survey administrator should adjust these 
variable inputs to determine whether acquisition professionals would be more prone to an 
incremental approach. As a result, a sensitivity analysis on these inputs may provide further 
information into how acquisition professionals prioritize information and what would trigger 
an incremental approach selection in the survey.  
Certain changes to the survey inputs may drive participant responses to create a 
JAGM-like strategy. One recommendation for the survey administrator is to change levels of 
risk in the risk assessment. A higher risk level for a missile subcomponent or system 
integration capability would likely change a participant’s view on the needed strategy 
changes. The TRL is another change that would likely adjust a strategy to replicate the 
JAGM’s strategy. Changing the projected timeframe for the JCM’s EMD phase to a point of 
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impacting the IOC is also likely to push the survey participant to implement an incremental 
approach.  
3. Incentives for Survey Takers to Increase Percentage of Completion 
The survey’s application is appropriate for a final capstone course within an 
acquisition systems management curriculum. The survey requires participants to recall 
lessons learned and apply critical thinking to answer the questions. The survey administrator 
can easily assess knowledge retained and the effectiveness of key points addressed prior to 
the capstone course. Administrators have multiple options to mandate survey completion. An 
instructor may structure a final exam around the survey and require participation for course 
graduation.  
Defense Acquisition University administrators use continuous learning points to 
ensure that professional growth is emphasized in the workforce. The DOD Instruction 
5000.66 states that "All AWF members must engage in at least 80 hours of CL every 2 years 
(with a goal of engaging in 40 hours annually), commencing from the time the member 
enters an AWF position throughout his or her continuous tenure in the AWF" 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2017b, p. 28). Survey administrators can utilize the survey to gather data on 
the workforce’s knowledge base of the current preferred acquisition strategies and provide a 
learning experience to participants.  
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APPENDIX. PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
Acquisition Strategy Survey 
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By checking this box, you agree to participate in this preliminary survey that is 
intended to collect data on the development of acquisition strategies. 
 
Mark the circles that apply: 
 
Rank 
o Flag Officer / SES 
o O6 / GS-15 
o O5 / GS-14 










o PEO / DPEO 
o PEO Staff 
o O6 PM / DPM 
o O6 PMO Staff 
o O5 PM / DPM 
o O5 PM Staff 
o Service HQ ACQ Staff
Credentials 
o SSC Grad. 
o Senior ACQ Crs. 
Grad. 
o DAWIA PM Level III 
o DAWIA PM Level II 
o DAWIA PM Level I 
o PMP Certified 
o ACQ. Workforce 
Mem. 
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INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
You are currently the PM for the Joint Common Missile (JCM) following the 
Materiel Development Decision (MDD) to begin development of a materiel solution.  
 
TASK: 
Thoroughly read and analyze the JCM background, constraints, and strategy options. 
Choose the best strategy option and support your selection by answering the follow-
up questions for the section you chose. 
 
CONDITION: 
Given the JCM key performance parameters (KPP), previously completed risk 
assessment, budgetary environment, and JCM timeline constraints, complete the 
survey in a classroom environment. 
 
STANDARD: 
Choose the best JCM strategy option based on your assessment of the program 
constraints. Answer the follow-up questions to explain your choices.    
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SITUATION: 
 You are preparing for a Milestone (MS) B decision to enter Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) and award competitive EMD contracts. The JCM 
program is an Acquisition Category-1D (ACAT-1D) program with planned MS B in six 
months. The JCM program just finished a very successful three-year Technology Maturation 
& Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, which met all exit criteria in which all Critical 
Technology Elements (CTE) were assessed at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6. 
Successful Science & Technology Objectives (STO) efforts by Research Development & 
Engineering Command (RDECOM) proceeded the TMRR phase. Solid analysis during the 
TMRR phase underpinned the requirements for the JCM program. The Capabilities Based 
Assessment (CBA) documented the need for JCM, along with an approved Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD). An approved analysis of alternatives (AoA) helped solidify the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved Capability Development Document 
(CDD) requirements, including the KPP thresholds/objectives. 
 The user has an operational and logistical need for development of the JCM to replace 
the Hellfire, Maverick, and aviation-launched TOW missiles for the Army and Navy. The 
services desire increased range, capability, force protection, and a decreased logistic 
footprint. The current platforms and accompanied missiles are as follows: the Hellfire 
(average unit procurement cost [AUPC] = $58,200–$115,600) is shot from the AH-64D with 
either precision point (PP) or millimeter wavelength (MMW) targeting modes with separate 
warheads; the TOW (AUPC = $63,700–$92,500) is fired from the AH-1Z and MH-60 wire-
guided targeting; and the Maverick (AUPC = $179,000) is fired from the F/A-18 E/F with 
either PP or infrared (IR) targeting with a different warheads. All current missiles have 
single-mode seeking capability only, with separate warheads. A single JCM is capable of 
replacing more than a dozen variants of Hellfire, Maverick, and TOW missiles. 
 
Draft Acquisition Program Baseline (APB): The following performance, schedule and 
cost data outlines the constraints applied to the JCM program.  
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SCHEDULE: 
 The current program is constructed to support a single block acquisition strategy and 
will deliver full capability thereafter. The CDD has forecasted Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) of the JCM at MS B +5 years (60 months). The EMD phase has been planned for 48 
months. Therefore, the significant event estimates are a CDR at MS B +2 years (24 months), 
MS C at MS B +4 years (48 months), and IOC at MS B +5 years (60 months).  
   
COST: 
 The acquisition objective (AO) for the JCM is 63,978 missiles to be procured for the 
Army and Navy. Cost estimates have determined an AUPC of $108,000 (with multi-year 
contract vehicle) and $120,000 (without multi-year contract vehicle) by the program office. 
The program has been incorporated into the services POM and is fully funded. The JCM 
Joint Cost Proposal (JCP) has been approved, and the Army and Navy fully funded a 48-
month EMD with research development test and evaluation (RDT&E) funding and a 10-year 
production and development (P&D) with procurement funding. 
 
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE: 
 The JCM has the following work breakdown structure (WBS) that highlights 





 The program’s Integrated Product Team (IPT) conducted a thorough risk assessment 
approved by both the Army and Navy. The following risk assessment (RA) links the critical 
technology elements of the design with the user requirements. A narrative of risks follows 
the figure.  
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 Risk 1: Multipurpose Warhead Fuse–The JCM must defeat a wide array of targets 
(KKP 2). The warhead technology is highly complex because each target requires different 
engagement mechanisms to achieve the required lethality.  
  
 Risk 2: Missile Integration–The tri-mode seeker, multi-purpose warhead, and 
propulsion system require intensive software synchronization.  
 
 Risk 3: Propulsion–The boost and sustain technology requires high turn down ratios 
to adjust the propulsion nozzle in order to achieve rotary and fixed wing ranges (KKP 3). 
Most existing platforms have a turn down ratio of 4, but the JCM requires a ratio of 8. In 
addition, the wide range of environmental conditions between rotary and fixed wing assets is 
hard to address in a single motor. 
 
 Risk 4: Seeker Software–The tri-mode seeker requires integrated hardware and 
software for real time acquisition and tracking of targets with the three sensors (KKP 1).  
Risk 4a: Seeker Dome–The dome must be able to transmit radiation for the radar wave, 
infrared signature, and laser designation (KPP 1). However, the seeker must prevent radar 
penetration other radar bands in the operational environment, which complicates the dome 
design and material usage.  
 
 Risk 5: Platform Integration–The missile must integrate with the on-board fire control 
systems for each of the service platforms (KPP4). In addition, the JCM must be shipboard 
compatible.  
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TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS: 
 The JCM program stakeholders agree that the three most important sub-component 
technologies are currently assessed at the following readiness levels: 
 
Tri-mode Seeker–TRL 6 
Multipurpose Warhead–TRL 6 
Common Rocket Motor–TRL 6 
 
ICE and Affordability Assessment: 
 
The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated the EMD phase to be from 72 to 
144 months. 
 
The CAIG estimated the AUPC as $153,000. 
 
These estimates are based on previous service missile efforts for dual mode seekers. The 
CAIG independent cost estimate (ICE) raises some affordability concerns based on the draft 
APB AUPC and execution concerns because of the high likelihood of cost and schedule 
breaches with the draft APB. 
 
--------------------------------------END OF PROGRAM DATA---------------------------------- 
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SURVEY: 
 The section below requires you to select cost, schedule, and performance options 
based off the JCM program data annotated above. Each section addresses different 
acquisition strategy methods you can choose from. After completing the initial question of 
acquisition strategy choice (Single Block, Two Increments, Three Increments), you will in 
turn answer questions corresponding to one of the three sections and justify your position.  
 
 
What is your Acquisition Strategy for the JCM program based off of the program information 
provided? 
 
A. Single Block Acquisition Strategy (Section 1) 
B. Two Increments: Incremental Acquisition Strategy (Section 2) 
C. Three Increments: Incremental Acquisition Strategy (Section 3) 
 
*Upon your selection please complete your designated section ONLY. 
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SECTION 1: SINGLE BLOCK ACQUISITION  
 
1. Based on the program information, select the length of EMD phase appropriate for your 
strategy.  
 
A. 48 Months (Draft APB based on POM) 
B. 72 Months (Low CAIG ICE Estimate) 
C. 144 months (12 years) (High CAIG ICE Estimate) 
D. Other (Specify) ________Months 
 
a) Justify your selection. 
 
b) How would you address the high-risk schedule concerns if you select a 48-month 
EMD phase? 
 
2. Select the program AUPC appropriate for your strategy.  
 
A. $108,000 (Draft APB based on JCP with Multi-Year Contract) 
B. $120,000 (Draft APB based on JCP without Multi-Year Contract) 
C. $153,000 (CAIG ICE estimate) 
D. Other (Specify) $________ 
 
 Justify your selection. 
 
3. Based on the requirements, select the capabilities of the JCM that you will develop: 
 
Seeker 





o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 




o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 
o F/A-18 (KPP) 
o UH-60 (KPP) 
 
 If you did not select a KPP, how do you propose to get relief from a directed KPP? 
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SECTION 2: TWO INCREMENTS: INCREMENTAL APPROACH 
 
1. Based on the program information, select the length of EMD phase by increment 
appropriate for your strategy.  
 
Increment I 
A. 48 Months 
B. 72 Months 
C. 144 Months 
D. Other (Specify) ________Months 
 
Increment II 
A. 48 Months 
B. 72 Months 
C. 144 Months 
D. Other (Specify) ________Months 
 










D. Other (Specify) $________ 
 





D. Other (Specify) $________ 
 









o Single Mode 
(COTS) 
o Dual-Mode 
o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 




o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 
o F/A-18 (KPP) 
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o Single Mode 
(COTS) 
o Dual-Mode 
o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 





o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 
o F/A-18 (KPP) 
o UH-60 (KPP
 If you did not select a KPP, how do you propose to get relief from a directed KPP? 
 
 
4. This COA would require a year delay in program start to align requirements and funding, 
and the current year RDT&E money would be lost. How would you receive service approval 
to delay MS B, get JROC CDD approval, and realigning the services Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) submission and the JCP? 
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SECTION 3: THREE INCREMENTS: INCREMENTAL APPROACH 
 
1. Based off the program information, select the length of EMD phase by increment 
appropriate for your strategy.  
 
Increment I 
A. 48 Months 
B. 72 Months 
C. 147 Months 




A. 48 Months 
B. 72 Months 
C. 147 Months 




A. 48 Months 
B. 72 Months 
C. 147 Months 
D. Other (Specify) 
________Months 
Justify your selection. 
  
 




























o Single Mode 
(COTS) 
o Dual-Mode 
o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 




o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 
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o Single Mode 
(COTS) 
o Dual-Mode 
o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 




o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 








o Single Mode 
(COTS) 
o Dual-Mode 
o Tri-Mode (KPP) 
 
Warhead 




o Single Motor 
(COTS) 
o Common Motor 
(KPP) 
Platform Integrated 
o AH-64 (KPP) 
o AH-1Z (KPP) 
o F/A-18 (KPP) 
o UH-60 (KPP)
 




4. This COA would require a year delay in program start to align requirements and funding, 
and the current year RDT&E money would be lost. How would you receive service approval 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 69 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acquisition strategy (AS). (2017, October 9). In ACQuipedia: Your online acquisition 
encyclopedia. Retrieved from Defense Acquisition University website: 
https://www.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=2338b79c-7d13-
4802-aac1-d905c2d95c0a 
Acquisition Research Program. (n.d.). The Acquisition Research Program (ARP) sponsored 




A’Hearn, C. W., Bergmen, D. E., & Hirsch, B. (1988). Joint logistics commanders guidance 
for the use of an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy in acquiring command and 
control (C2) systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center. 
Army Test and Evaluation Command. (2003, July). JCM consensus risk assessment. 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Army Test and Evaluation Command. 
Barron, J. (1983, September 1). High cost of military parts. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/01/business/high-cost-of-military parts.html 
Boehm, B., & Hansen, W. J. (2001, January). Understanding the spiral model as a tool for 
evolutionary acquisition. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Burke, R. P. (2004, April 16). Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) independent cost 
estimate (ICE) for Joint Common Missile Program Milestone B review 
[Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics). 
Common Missile Project Office. (2003, September 8). Acquisition Strategy & Acquisition 
Plan for the Joint Common Missile (JCM) (Acquisition Strategy Report). Redstone 
Arsenal, AL: Program Executive Office, Tactical Missiles. 
Department of Defense. (2007, December). Selected acquisition report (SAR): Small 
Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB) (SDB I). Eglin AFB, FL: Author. 
Department of Defense. (2017, September). Selected acquisition report (SAR): Small 
Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II). Eglin AFB, FL: Author. 
Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–433, 
100 Stat. 992 (1988, October 1). 
Government Accountability Office (2014). Agencies need to establish and implement 
incremental development policies. Washington, DC: Author. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 70 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Government Accountability Office (2016). Agencies need to increase their use of 
incremental development practices. Washington, DC: Author. 
Gregory, E. J. (2004, May 7). The Joint Common Missile (JCM) Joint cost position 
[Memorandum for the Army Acquisition Executive].Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army. 
JAGM Product Office. (2014, September 26). Acquisition strategy for Joint Air-to-Ground 
Missile (JAGM) Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase and Low-
Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Acquisition Strategy, 40. Redstone Arsenal, AL: 
Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space. 
Joint Attack Munition Systems Project Office. (2015, May 20). Joint Air-to-Ground Missile 
(JAGM) Milestone B brief. Washington, DC: Author 
Joint Attack Munition Systems Project Office. (2016, April 4). Joint Air-to-Ground Missile 
Program infomation paper. Washington, DC: Author. 
Joint Common Missile Program Office. (2004, April 22). Joint Common Missile: Defense 
Acquisition Board brief. Redstone Arsenal, AL: Author. 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). (2004, April 4). Capability development 
document for Joint Common Missile. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). (2012, October 1). Capability development 
document for the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM). Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense. 
Larman, C., & Vasili, V. R. (2003). Iterative and incremental development: A brief history. 
Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office. 
Lorell, M. A., Payne, L. A., & Mehta, K. R. (2017). Program characteristics that contribute 
to cost growth: A comparison of Air Force Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Mattis, J. (2018, February 6). Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis House Armed Services 
Committee written statement for the record, Tuesday February 6, 2018. Washington, 
DC: Author. 
Mortlock, R. F. (2005, January). The Joint Common Missile Project. Army AL&T Magazine. 
Retrieved from https://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/archives/2005/Jan-Feb_2005.pdf 
Mortlock, R. F. (2017, April 18). MN3331: Acquisition strategy [Lecture]. Monterey, CA. 
Retrieved from https://cle.nps.edu/portal/site/37df98b5-b74b-4a4f-897e-
6bf57f1d7e08/page/c1185a27-af00-4da9-8816-d4072f0ca2a6 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 901, 100 
Stat. 3816 (1986, November 14). 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 71 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 802, 116 
Stat. 2458 (2002, December 2). 
Obituary for David Packard. (2007, February 7). Retrieved from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070207145215/http://obits.com/packarddavid.html 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (OUSD[A]). (1987, September 1). 
Major and non-major defense acquisition programs (Department of Defense 
Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (OUSD[A]). (1991, February 23). 
Defense acquisition management policies and procedures (Department of Defense 
Instruction 5000.2). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (1996, March 15). Defense acquisition (Department of Defense 
Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2000, October 23). The Defense Acquisition System (Department 
of Defense Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2003, May 12). The Defense Acquisition System (Department of 
Defense Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2007, November 20). The Defense Acquisition System 
(Department of Defense Directive 5000.1). Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2017a, February 2). Operation of the defense acquistion system 
(Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02). Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2017b, July 27). Defense acquisition workforce education, 
training, experience, and career development (DOD Instruction 5000.66). 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Packard, D. (1986). A quest for excellence: Final report to the president by the President’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense. 
Sleevi, N. F., & Mount, R. (2003, December 18). Joint Common Missile (JCM) joint analysis 
of alternatives final results SAG briefing. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army 
TRADOC Analysis Center. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 72 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Wolfowitz, P. (2004). Department of Defense program budget decision 753 memorandum. 






Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Ingersoll Hall 
Monterey, CA 93943 
        www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
 
